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1 Introduction
Many real world matching markets fail to match all participants. Those who are
unmatched may either leave the market altogether or wait and participate in a
later matching procedure. The example that we study here is the allocation of
graduating lawyers to their legal trainee-ship at regional courts in Germany. In
this market congestion arises because of excess demand for positions in some
parts of the country. This congestion is managed by requiring unmatched ap-
plicants to enter a wait list for their trainee-ship. To ensure that lawyers will
eventually obtain a position at a court, the priority of a lawyer increases with
the acquired waiting time. We assume that lawyers have preferences over where
and when they complete their legal trainee-ship. The preferences over time are
however ignored by the currently used procedure, which leads to a lack of effi-
ciency, justified envy and a lack of respect of improvements. We propose a new
procedure that does not suffer from those shortcomings.
The focus of this work is the trainee-ship allocation problem between grad-
uated lawyers on the one side and courts on the other side. This is an important
market as each year there are approximately 8,000 positions for legal trainee-
ship in Germany.1 These numbers are comparable to the (roughly) 20,000 US
hospital residency program matches per year studied by Roth and others, e.g. in
Roth (1984). In this lawyer market the wage is regulated so it cannot be used to
reduce congestion by balancing excess demand.
Unlike in the United States, in Germany lawyers typically begin their le-
gal education as an undergraduate, studying law at a university for around four
years. Afterward students take a first state exam, set by the 16 federal states.
Following this, students may apply for a legal trainee-ship. Completion of the
trainee-ship is necessary to practice law in Germany and a requirement for many
jobs in the bureaucracy. It is thus important to ensure access to trainee-ships for
all lawyers who wish to complete it.
There is no cooperation across the federal states in terms of having a single
national market for positions. This means that each lawyer can in principle ap-
1Based on authors’ calculations using data from http://www.juristenkoffer.de/
rechtsreferendariat/ (Accessed 8. October 2015).
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ply for a position in each of the federal states.2 This leads to sizable congestion,
since in the extreme the total number of registered applicants in the system will
be several times the number of positions actually demanded by the lawyers. We
suspect that multiple applications by some lawyers for positions in several fed-
eral states is at least partially responsible for long waiting times as some lawyers
apply for positions as a safety option which they are unlikely to take. The au-
thorities seem to be aware of this possibility. Several application forms contain
declarations that there are no pending applications to other regional courts of ap-
peals or require applicants to withdraw other applications.3 If they do not accept
a position after they have been offered one, then the application system requires
the lawyers to inform the respective authorities in the federal state.4 The au-
thorities may then decide to allow additional lawyers to begin their trainee-ship
at that period. This process of refusing and making new offers takes up time
and may leave some positions unused if no other lawyers can be found to take
up these positions.5 Note that this process of formally accepting and rejecting
offers could also be addressed by allowing lawyers to formally declare some
courts as unacceptable and committing applicants to accepting any position that
they were offered. However if the value of the outside option is unknown at the
time preferences are submitted, then this will not alleviate the problem of offers
being refused.6
While the organization of the allocation procedure by federal state, rather
than having a national procedure, seems to us to be a major cause of congestion
2The allocation of lawyers to courts is organized by regional courts of appeals in each state.
Some federal states, notably Bavaria and North Rhine-Westfalia, contain several regional courts
of appeals so even within a state there is scope for greater coordination.
3See for example the application web page of the regional court of appeals in Mu-
nich, https://www.justiz.bayern.de/gericht/olg/m/studiosi/01441/index.php
(accessed 8. October 2015).
4For example, Art. 4 of the “Verordnung über die Aufnahme in den juristischen Vorbere-
itungsdienst” of Hamburg states that applicants who have not accepted a position that was of-
fered to them within 10 days, will not be allocated. Furthermore it says that if an applicant
does not accept a position twice, the applicant will be excluded from the application procedure
and will have to reapply. Last, it says positions which have not been accepted are allocated to
applicants next in line.
5For example on 6. October 2015 in North Rhine-Westfalia there were 12 positions still
to be filled to begin on 1. November 2015. See http://www.olg-duesseldorf.nrw.
de/aufgaben/referendarabteilung/09_weiter_info/index.php (accessed 8. October
2015). Congestion problems arising from the need to sequentially inquire about agents accep-
tance and rejection of offers have been found for example in the market for clinical psychology,
Roth and Xing (1997).
6This is the case when several federal states run their allocation procedures in parallel.
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in the market for lawyers, addressing this problem would require coordinated
action of the federal states. Given the difficulty of establishing such cooperation,
we here take the approach to consider only an isolated federal state and analyze
how the allocation procedure in that federal state should be designed to better
handle the congestion resulting from the lack of national coordination. We thus
treat the federalized nature of this labor market as an additional constraint to be
respected by the market designer, akin to the constraint that monetary flexibility
cannot be used to clear some matching markets (e.g. for kidneys or schools7).
The number of available positions for the trainee-ship varies by court and
usually depends on its size and the budget that has been made available for
legal trainees in the budget of the federal state and/or the capacity of the court.
This budget is usually set for several starting dates in advance. For example,
the relevant administrative order in Berlin states that the capacity needs to be
determined for one year in advance while positions may be started in February,
May, August and December.8 In Hamburg, the relevant administrative order
states that the number of positions is determined by the number of positions
fixed in the budget, which is valid for at least one year. Trainee-ships can start
every even-numbered month.9 In Hessen capacities are set every half a year,
while new positions are available in all odd-numbered months.10
Due to large numbers of applications in some federal states, not all lawyers
applying for a position at a court can be allocated at their desired starting time.11
The excess demand is managed via a system based on waiting times accumu-
lated by the applicants.12 Most federal states have a system whereby a lawyer’s
priority in being allocated a place at a court increases in the number of times that
7See Roth, Sönmez and Ünver (2004) and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003)
8See Art. 2 (2) in the “Verordnung über die Ausbildungskapazität und das Vergabeverfahren
für den juristischen Vorbereitungsdienst” (Stadt Berlin (2004)) for setting capacities. Dates for
entry into the trainee-ship are taken from http://www.berlin.de/sen/justiz/gerichte/
kg/ausbildung/jur-vorb/bew-verf/ (accessed 6. October 2015).
9See Art. 2 and Art. 3 (1) in the “Verordnung über die Aufnahme in den juristischen Vor-
bereitungsdienst” (Hansestadt Hamburg (2012)) for how capacities are set and the dates when
trainee-ships start, respectively.
10See the guidelines on the legal trainee-ship for Hesse.
11Most application forms ask for the desired entry date of an applicant. Even if applicants
could only apply for the next starting date, delaying applications until that date ensures that
students can affect the time period for which they are considered.
12For example, in Berlin for entry on August 3rd 2015 applicants with a grade of 10 or higher
were admitted if they applied 5 months earlier. Those who did their state exam in Berlin were
admitted if they applied 10 months earlier, while those who did their state exam elsewhere with
a grade below 10 were admitted if they applied 11 months earlier.
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lawyer was not matched. For example in Hamburg, grades, waiting time and
other concerns are weighted and expressed as a single score for each lawyer.13
In North Rhine-Westfalia by contrast only the time since the application was re-
ceived by the regional court of appeals determines the ranking of a candidate.14
In Hessen 35% of positions are reserved for applicants with the highest waiting
time.15 In Brandenburg 70% of positions are reserved for applicants with the
highest waiting time.16 Thereby it is in principle possible for each lawyer to
gain some place in a federal state eventually. Currently, average waiting times
can be up to 24 months, depending on the federal state, although it should be
noted that in many states waiting time is zero or only a couple of months.17
When applying for a position lawyers can typically indicate a preference
for a particular regional court.18 While lawyers can submit rankings over the
courts, there is no legal guarantee of being assigned the first choice court.19
While in general the allocation of lawyers to courts should take into account
reported preferences, capacities and priorities, we could not find a clear descrip-
tion of the methods used to allocate lawyers to courts.20 Some regional courts
13Art. 5 of the Aufnahmeverordnung (AVO,Hansestadt Hamburg (2012)) sets rules on how
to calculate this score. The base score is the minimum of 6.49 and the grade achieved by the
lawyer in the first state exam (Art. 5 (1) AVO). Further points can be added for example for
having completed military service, disabilities, having done the state exam in Hamburg and for
every 6 months of accumulated waiting time (Art. 5 (2) AVO). In case of ties in the weighted
score, Art. 6 (1) AVO instructs to use the grade in the state exam to break ties. Remaining ties
are to be broken via lottery according to Art. 6 (2) AVO.
14See https://www.justiz.nrw.de/WebPortal/JM/landesjustizpruefungsamt/
juristischer_vorbereitungsdienst/2Einstellung/index.php (accessed 7. October
2015).
15See the Justizprüfungsamt Hessen (2011). Another 50% are reserved for lawyers based on
merit and the remaining 15% are reserved for applicants satisfying social criteria.
16See Art. 11 (3) of the “Juristenausbildungsgesetz” of Brandenburg (Land Brandenburg
(2014)). 20% of positions are given based on waiting time, with the remaining 10% given based
on social criteria.
17Based on data from http://www.juristenkoffer.de/rechtsreferendariat/ (Ac-
cessed 8. October 2015).
18For example lawyers applying to do their trainee-ship in the district of the Dusseldorf (North
Rhine-Westfalia) regional court of appeals can apply to the regional courts in Dusseldorf, Duis-
burg, Kleve, Krefeld, Mönchengladbach or Wuppertal.
19For example, Art. 30 (3) of the Lawyer Education Law of North Rhine-Westfalia (Juris-
tenausbildungsgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen, JAG NRW) states that there is no legal right to a
position in a particular district of a regional court of appeals and at a particular time.
20For example, in the guidelines on the application in the Dusseldorf district, it simply says
that lawyers are allocated to courts following a “comprehensive view” of all applications. This
may result in lawyers not getting their first choice so that they are asked to indicate further
preferences, (Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2015b)).
5
of appeal give some additional insights into how lawyers are allocated to par-
ticular courts. For example, applicants to Munich are ranked according to a
number of criteria.21 The highest priority is given to applicants having to care
for their children, followed by married couples having lived for at least one year
in the desired location. Next come those suffering from serious illnesses and
then those working as teaching assistants at universities in the desired location.
Finally, the length of time that applicants have lived in the desired location is
used. There is however no indication in what way those priorities are used.
To analyze the market while accounting for waiting time, we propose a
lawyer-court matching problem based on Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).22 On
the one side of the market there are lawyers, who have preferences over as-
signments to courts over time. Courts on the other side have priorities over
lawyers, possibly based on their grade, social criteria and accumulated waiting
time, which together with the current time period determines a lawyer’s waiting
time.23 A matching mechanism in this context produces an allocation consisting
of a subset of contracts, which specify a lawyer, a court and the time period the
trainee-ship begins. Capacities of a court in future periods are already known,
as we discussed above.
Based on the features of the currently used procedure we introduce the
“Berlin” mechanism. This mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient. We show
that this mechanism may lead to allocations where one lawyer justifiably en-
vies another. Furthermore improvements of the ranking achieved by a lawyer
may yield an allocation that is worse for that lawyer. However, by construction,
the Berlin mechanism achieves an allocation, such that no currently available
positions remain unfilled while allocating some lawyers to later positions.
We propose the time-specific choice function, which is a special case of
choice functions based on slot-specific priorities of Kominers and Sönmez
(2016). Here time-specific means that each court can only accept a fixed number
of students to begin their trainee-ship in a given period. Using the time-specific
choice functions, the cumulative offer process of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)
21See the criteria for the allocation of trainee-ships, Oberlandesgericht München, (2015).
22 Other related papers are Hatfield and Kojima (2010), Kominers and Sönmez (2016), Sön-
mez (2013) and Sönmez and Switzer (2013).
23In the district of the regional court of appeals in Dusseldorf, it is explicitly stated that a
higher waiting time does not affect the allocation to a desired court (Oberlandesgericht Düssel-
dorf (2015b)).
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is used to find stable allocations. Extending beyond current results, we can
show the existence of a lawyer-optimal stable allocation, when lawyers prefer
earlier assignments. In cases where lawyers’ preferences are unrestricted, no
such lawyer-optimal stable allocation need exist.
The time-specific choice function does not satisfy some properties used in
the previous literature. Notably it fails to satisfy the unilateral substitutes con-
dition and the law of aggregate demand. Hence we cannot use the results of
Hatfield and Kojima (2009) and Hatfield and Kojima (2010). We instead apply
the results of Kominers and Sönmez (2016) to show that the time-specific lawyer
proposing mechanism is (group) strategy-proof for the lawyers. Moreover, this
mechanism is weakly Pareto efficient, eliminates justified envy and respects im-
provements. Furthermore, our mechanism creates incentives for all lawyers to
report verifiable information increasing their priority at a court. However, it may
allocate some lawyers to later positions while leaving some currently available
positions unfilled. It thus allows current lawyers to obtain better positions at the
expense of future lawyers.
We consider another modified version of the matching with contracts model,
in which we no longer have time-specific constraints for each court. Instead,
courts face only aggregate capacity constraints and are able to shift their posi-
tions flexibly over time. This would be applicable if courts had control over their
own budgets over a period of some years. We construct the flexible choice func-
tion for courts, based on the time-specific choice function. The resulting flexible
lawyer-optimal stable mechanism (FLOSM) is (group) strategy-proof, weakly
Pareto efficient, while eliminating justified envy and respecting improvements.
Furthermore it Pareto dominates the allocation obtained when time-specific ca-
pacity constraints need to be respected. It may however violate the time-specific
capacity constraints of the courts.
While our model has been developed with the entry-level labor market for
lawyers in Germany in mind, there are potentially many more applications of the
basic framework. For example, university admissions in Germany for some very
competitive courses, such as medicine, often ration places by putting unsuccess-
ful applicants on waiting lists. A certain fraction of all seats is then reserved for
those applicants who have waited a sufficient number of periods. Another poten-
tial application concerns the allocation of aspiring teachers to teaching trainee-
ship positions at schools, in a system very similar to that of lawyers. The main
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difference to the market for lawyers is that teachers differ based on their cho-
sen subjects, so that schools’ preferences over teachers will be more complex
than courts’ priorities over lawyers. In addition schools are likely to be strategic
players, unlike the courts. A position for math and physics teacher could for
example be filled either by one teacher for both subjects or by two teachers each
responsible for one of the subjects. Further interesting applications of match-
ing with waiting times are (social or student) house allocation problems. For
example, if there are a number of different projects to construct social housing
that finished at different, known points in time then our model could be directly
applied.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
the relevant literature. The model and some definitions are introduced in Sec-
tion 3. Using our model, in Section 4 we analyze the currently applied Berlin
mechanism and its properties. In Section 5 we propose mechanisms based on
matching with contracts. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs
that are not in the main text.
2 Literature
This paper fits into the research agenda started by Gale and Shapley (1962) on
two-sided matching. For a summary of research in this vein until 1990, see Roth
and Sotomayor (1990). Two-sided matching has found important applications
in the design of labor markets. For examples of the application of two-sided
matching to medical entry-level labor markets see Roth (1984), Roth (1991) or
Roth and Peranson (1999). More recently a number of papers have applied the
original two-sided matching problem to the allocation of seats at universities,
for instance Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and, more prominently, to the design
of school choice mechanisms (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003; Abdulka-
diroğlu, Pathak, Roth and Sönmez, 2005a; Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and Roth,
2005b).
The canonical model of matching with contracts is due to Hatfield and Mil-
grom (2005),24 which was later extended by Hatfield and Kojima (2008), Hat-
field and Kojima (2009), Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Hatfield, Kominers,
24Fleiner (2003) uses a similar fixed-point approach to find stable matchings.
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Nichifor, Ostrovsky and Westkamp (2015a). Some early precursors of this type
of model are Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982).
In two recent contributions by Sönmez and Switzer (2013) and Sönmez
(2013) new applications of the matching with contracts model to the alloca-
tion of cadets to branches of the US Army are introduced. Their treatment
relies heavily on the recent result of the literature on matching with contracts
and shows their practical relevance. In their case the number of years a cadet
commits to serve in the army is the contract term. In our model the time at
which a lawyer starts her trainee-ship is the contract term. Our work is closely
related to and makes use of results in Kominers and Sönmez (2016) who study
a more general slot-specific matching with contracts model. We use their re-
sults to show (group) strategy-proofness and respect of improvements for our
preferred mechanism, the time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism. We
additionally show the existence of a lawyer-optimal stable mechanism by as-
suming weak impatience for the lawyers.25 In recent work, Aygun and Turhan
(2016) study dynamic reserves in Indian engineering school admission, where
some seats might remain unfilled due to affirmative action reserves. Also using
the matching with contracts framework and a new choice function for schools,
the authors employ privilege types as contractual terms. In our paper we con-
sider the time dimension, giving rise to additional dynamic properties.
There are several papers considering dynamic matching models. Leshno
(2015) considers a queuing model in which agents are of two (privately known)
types and can be assigned to one of two objects. There is overload in the sense
that there are many agents waiting to be assigned an object. This model differs
from ours in that the arrival of objects is random, whereas in our model it is
known. Furthermore Leshno (2015) assumes that waiting is equally costly for
agents, whereas in our model agents differ in time preferences.
Thakral (2015) studies a model similar to Leshno (2015) and ours, where
agents are assigned to public housing. In his model houses arrive stochasti-
cally over time due to existing tenants moving out of public housing at their
discretion. He assumes that agents are weakly impatient in the sense that being
assigned public housing earlier is preferred to it being assigned later. Assuming
25An alternative route towards our results can be found in Hatfield, Kominers and Westkamp
(2015b) who provide conditions for cumulative offer processes to yield stable and strategy-proof
mechanisms.
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that there is a common ordering of the houses over the agents, he introduces a
strategy-proof mechanism that eliminates justified envy and is efficient evalu-
ated at a particular point in time. If the realization of the house arrival process
in the model of Thakral (2015) were known, it would correspond to our model
in which the available positions in the future are known.
Kadam and Kotowski (2015) consider a two-sided matching model in which
agents may have different partners over time. Their model set-up could be for-
mulated in terms of a matching with waiting time model as we propose. The
difference to our model is that both sides of the market would be allowed to sign
multiple contracts even if all agents can only be matched to one other agent in a
given period of time. In addition, they focus on different notions of stability.
Another related literature is the one on dynamic matching markets. Papers
in that literature have, to our knowledge, not yet made use of the matching with
contracts framework. Damiano and Lam (2005) consider one-to-one matching
markets which are repeated over time. Here the outcome is a matching associ-
ating one man to a woman for each period. Similarly, Kurino (2009) considers
one-to-one repeated matching markets. The focus in the latter paper is on a new
notion of credible group-stable dynamic matchings. The paper by Bloch and
Houy (2012) considers the allocation of a set of durable objects to agents who
successively arrive and live for two periods. Related, Kurino (2014) considers a
dynamic house allocation problem in which agents arrive successively and live
for two periods. Abdulkadiroğlu and Loertscher (2007) also consider a dynamic
house allocation problem. That paper compares static and dynamic mecha-
nisms, finding that the latter can improve welfare upon the former. Another
market design application of dynamic matching problems is Kennes, Monte and
Tumennasan (2014) who consider the allocation of small children to daycare
facilities in Denmark. Our paper differs from these papers insofar as in our pa-
per the outcome is a set of contracts in which each lawyer appears only once,
so no lawyer is matched repeatedly. Also, unlike the previous papers we make
explicit use of the matching with contracts literature, which might also be fruit-
fully applied in the papers just mentioned. To apply the matching with contracts
framework one would simply need to allow lawyers to hold multiple contracts.
This paper is also related to some papers within the theory of matching
which analyze different legal entry-level labor markets. Avery et al. (2001) pro-
vide empirical data and discuss possible reconstructions of the market for legal
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clerkships at US federal courts for graduating law students, primarily addressing
the unraveling problem. In Avery et al. (2007), the authors describe the unrav-
eling in this market and relate to the problem of exploding offers. Haruvy et al.
(2006) also study dynamics and unraveling inefficiencies of law clerk match-
ing, using experimental and computational investigations to evaluate proposed
reforms to the US system. Notably, this market is a decentralized one with no
central authority designing an allocation procedure. Additionally, there is some
conflict among the judges which prevents an effective coordination to improve
the system. In contrast, the market for legal trainee-ships in Germany is cen-
tralized within districts of regional courts of appeals. While unraveling does not
appear to happen in the allocation of lawyers in Germany, congestion is an im-
portant issue. Our paper is thus also related to common themes of the literature
on markets suffering various defects (Roth and Xing, 1994; Niederle and Roth,
2003, 2009) and on how to improve the design of markets to overcome these
defects (Roth and Peranson, 1999).
Two further related papers are Schummer and Vohra (2013) and Schummer
and Abizada (2015). The former paper considers the assignment of landing
slots to planes in the event of adverse weather. It shows the lack of incentives to
report truthfully the estimated arrival times for flights under the currently used
mechanism and proposes a strategy-proof alternative. That paper also highlights
the restrictions that notions of incentive compatibility impose on the efficiency
of the resulting mechanisms. The landing slot allocation problem as studied in
those papers also differs from the lawyer allocation problem studied here. First,
the paper assumes that all future arrival times are known by the airlines at the
time an allocation is made. Second, the airlines have homogeneous preferences
for early arrival at a single airport. So unlike in the present paper, there is only
one good to be allocated in any time period.
Last, this paper is also related to other papers analyzing allocation systems
in which some participants need to wait before being allocated. Braun et al.
(2010) and Westkamp (2013) both study the mechanism used to allocate medical
students to universities, where waiting times can be several years. However
their models of the allocation procedure are static in the sense that they consider
allocations for only one time period.
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3 Model
This section introduces the lawyer-court many-to-one matching with waiting
time problem. We abstract from complications arising from the fact that lawyers
arrive sequentially over time and focus on the case in which a given set of
lawyers is to be allocated to courts over several time periods. Each court can
only accept a fixed number of lawyers per period.
The lawyer assignment problem consists of the following components:
1. a finite set of periods T = {1, ..., tmax}
2. a finite set of lawyers I = {i1, ..., in}
3. a finite set of courts C = {c1, ...,cm}
4. a matrix of court capacities q = (qc,t)c∈C,t∈T
5. lawyers’ (strict, rational) preferences P = (Pi)i∈I over C×T ∪{ /0}, with
Ri denoting weak preferences of lawyer i.26 The domain of preference
profiles is denoted P .
6. a list of courts’ priority rankings, ≻= (≻c)c∈C over I.27
We call (T, I,C,q,P,≻) an instance of a lawyer-court matching with waiting
time problem. A contract is a triplet x=(i,c, t)∈ I×C×T , specifying a lawyer,
a court and the time at which the lawyer begins her trainee-ship at the court. Let
X ⊆ I ×C×T be the set of all feasible contracts. For contract x = (i,c, t) we
denote by xI the lawyer appearing in x, i.e. xI = i. Similarly we denote by xC
and xT the court and the time period of assignment appearing in contract x, i.e.
xC = c and xT = t. Further, let YI be the set of lawyers appearing in some set of
contracts Y ⊆ X , that is YI = {i ∈ I | ∃y ∈ Y s.t. yI = i}.
A subset of contracts Y ⊆ X is an allocation if for all i ∈ I, |{y ∈ Y : yI =
i}| ∈ {0,1} and for all c ∈C and t ∈ T , |{y ∈Y : yC = c}| ≤ ∑t qc,t . In words, an
allocation is a set of contracts such that no lawyer appears more than once and
there are not more contracts of a court for some period than number of positions
26This means that (c, t)Ri(c′, t ′) if and only if either (c, t)Pi(c′, t ′) or (c, t) = (c′, t ′).
27These can be thought of as a single score as a function of a lawyer’s grade, waiting time
and social factors, such as place of birth, current residence or place of study. Since we consider
a static setting, we will not consider how these priority rankings might change.
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available at that court overall. An allocation Y ⊆ X is feasible if for all c ∈ C
and t ∈ T , |{y ∈ Y : yC = c,yT = t| ≤ qc,t . Hence an allocation is feasible if
each court respects its time-specific capacity constraint for each period.28 Let
X̃ be the set of feasible allocations. For a subset of contracts Y denote by Y ( j)
the subset of contracts in Y involving agent j ∈ I ∪C alternatively, if j has no
contract in Y then Y ( j) is the empty set. Furthermore if Y is an allocation and
j ∈ I, let YT ( j) be the time of start of trainee-ship according to j’s contract in Y .
We define YC( j) accordingly.
A contract x is acceptable to lawyer i if xPi /0. We suppose that within the
set of courts C there is a court cG such that qcG,t = 0 for all t ∈ T and where
≻cG=≻G is the (weak) ranking induced by the lawyers’ grades. Similarly we
denote by cW the empty court with a ranking induced by waiting times, ≻W , and
by cS the empty court inducing a ranking by social hardship, ≻S. Note that this
modeling choice is not appropriate for all federal states. For example, Hamburg
uses a single score to determine which lawyers are allocated.
There are two possible interpretations of our model, the myopic and the
fully dynamic interpretation. Under the fully dynamic interpretation, akin to
models with overlapping generations of agents, we suppose that in the initial
period t = 1 it is already determined how many future agents there are, when
they “arrive”,29 what their preferences are and how they are ranked. Over short
horizons this may be a realistic possibility. However as the horizon that one
considers grows, this becomes increasingly unrealistic, especially since lawyers
typically only take their state exams in the period before they start applying for
positions.
Under the myopic interpretation one only considers the problem of allocat-
ing lawyers from a single generation to courts. In that interpretation we abstract
away from future generations of lawyers arriving.30 In the myopic view the ca-
pacities of the courts beyond the current period should then not be interpreted
as actual physical capacity, but as capacity which has not been reserved for fu-
ture generations of lawyers. The myopic interpretation ignores the uncertainty
involved in deciding how to allocate lawyers when the number and preferences
28Note that capacity used in one period does not affect capacity in future periods.
29A lawyer arrives in period t if all contracts involving an earlier period of allocation are
unacceptable to the lawyer.
30We do however incorporate some concern for future generations by considering a basic
notion of limiting harm to future generations - early filling, which we define in Subsection 3.1.
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of future lawyers are not yet known.
We denote by Pi not only preferences over i’s assignment of a court and a
time period, but also i’s preferences over allocations. These preferences over
allocations reflect i’s preferences over assignments, so there should be no loss
of clarity in this abuse of notation.
A direct mechanism ψ is a function ψ : P → X̃ .31 Hence ψ associates
to each (reported) preference profile an allocation. Note that we treat courts
as objects and hence they do not behave strategically, i.e. their priorities over
lawyers are assumed to be given. We also take waiting time as given and do not
consider changes in priorities arising from accumulated waiting time.
We now describe a few properties that lawyer preferences over the courts
and the time of allocation can satisfy.
Definition. Preferences of lawyer i ∈ I are weakly impatient if for all c ∈ C,
t, t ′ ∈ T such that t < t ′, then (c, t)Ri(c, t
′).
A lawyer’s preferences are weakly impatient if a lawyer prefers to be allo-
cated an early position at some court to a later position at the same court.
Definition. Preferences of lawyer i ∈ I are strictly impatient if for all c, c̃ ∈ C
t, t ′ ∈ T such that t < t ′, then (c, t)Ri(c̃, t
′).
Strict impatience is a strengthening of weak impatience. A lawyer having
strictly impatient preferences prefers an early position at any court to a later
position at any court. In practice we do not expect all lawyers’ preferences to
be strictly impatient. The reason is that there are some regions, e.g. Saxony-
Anhalt, in which the average waiting time is zero, while in other regions the
average waiting time is strictly positive. This would not be observed if lawyers’
preferences were strictly impatient, since in that case those waiting for a posi-
tion in a desirable region could just switch to a less desirable region without a
waiting time and thereby be better off. In addition many of the forms filled in by
lawyers when applying for a position allow them to indicate a preferred entry
date, which may differ from the next possible starting date.32 It appears that
31In full generality the mechanism should also depend on (T, I,C,q,≻). We suppress this
dependence for simplicity but will highlight whenever it becomes relevant, for example when
comparing the outcome of some mechanism when a court’s ranking of the lawyers has changed.
32See the application form for trainee-ships in the district of the Dusseldorf regional court of
appeals, Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2015a)
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many lawyers make use of the ability to postpone their starting date.33 While
delay of applicants may be for strategic reasons, delays may be rational if the
lawyer plans to obtain an additional qualification, such as a one-year law degree,
in the time up to the entry date. Hence it is not clear that lawyers’ preferences
are either weakly or strictly impatient.
3.1 Properties of Allocations and Mechanisms
To analyze the outcome of different mechanisms it is necessary to be able to talk
about properties of allocations. A basic requirement of an allocation is that no
lawyer should prefer the outside option to the court that she has been assigned:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X is individually rational if for all i ∈ I, Y (i)Ri /0.
A mechanism ψ is individually rational if ψ(P) is an individually rational allo-
cation.
Another basic requirement that any mechanism should satisfy is that it only
outputs feasible allocations.
Definition. A mechanism ψ is feasible if ψ(P) is a feasible allocation for all
P ∈ P .
We next introduce a common notion of fairness:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X has no justified envy, if for any pair of con-
tracts x,y ∈ Y with xI 6= yI and (xC,xT )PyI(yC,yT ), one of the following condi-
tions holds: xI ≻xC yI , xI ≻G yI , xI ≻W yI or xI ≻S yI . A mechanism ψ eliminates
justified envy if its outcome ψ (P) has no justified envy for all P ∈ P .
An allocation thus is envy-free if, whenever a lawyer prefers some other
lawyers’ assignment, then that lawyer must have a higher priority at the court
she is being assigned to than the former lawyer, a better grade, more waiting
time or a higher priority based on social hardship criteria. In standard notions
of fairness, usually only the court’s priorities are considered. Since the policy
maker in our case explicitly uses these other rankings to determine allocations,
33See the weighted list of applicants for positions in Hamburg, Hanseatisches Oberlandes-
gericht (2015). It can be seen that many lawyers have asked their entry date to be postponed for
several months.
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it appears natural to modify the standard notion of lack of justified envy to in-
corporate these additional concerns.
The following definition of Pareto dominance is standard.34
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X Pareto dominates another allocation Ỹ ⊆ X if
for all i ∈ I Y (i)RiỸ (i) and there exists at least one i ∈ I such that Y (i)PiỸ (i).
A mechanism ψ Pareto dominates another mechanism ψ̃ if for all P ∈ P ψ(P)
Pareto dominates ψ̃(P).
It is standard to define Pareto efficiency of an allocation by the absence of
another allocation that Pareto dominates it. None of the mechanisms that we
study in this paper satisfy this requirement. We thus consider a weaker notion
of efficiency:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆X is weakly Pareto efficient if there does not exist
an individually rational allocation Ỹ ⊆ X such that for all i ∈ I Ỹ (i)PiY (i). A
mechanism ψ is weakly Pareto efficient if for all P ∈ P ψ(P) is weakly Pareto
efficient.
As usual, a mechanism is strategy-proof if it is a dominant strategy for each
agent to truthfully report her preferences to the mechanism:
Definition. Mechanism ψ is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I, for all P ∈P and for
all P̃i ∈ Pi we have ψ(P)Riψ(P̃i,P−i). Mechanism ψ is group strategy-proof
if, for any preference profile P ∈ P , there is no Ĩ ⊆ I and P̃Ĩ = (P̃i)i∈Ĩ such that
for all i ∈ Ĩ we have ψ(P̃Ĩ,P−Ĩ)Piψ(P).
We next define respect of improvements, first used in the matching literature
by Balinski and Sönmez (1999).35 What that property means is that a lawyer
should not receive a worse assignment when her priority has increased at the
courts. First we need to define what we mean by an improvement in the priority
34Pareto efficiency is only defined with respect to the lawyers’ preferences. This is justified
by the fact that the courts’ priorities are set administratively and therefore do not constitute real
preferences. Instead they reflect a desire on by policy-makers to take into consideration grades,
waiting time and social criteria. The literature on school choice similarly considers only the
preferences of students for Pareto efficiency and treats schools as objects to be allocated (see
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003)).
35An alternative name for respect of improvements could be priority monotonicity, since
it requires that the rank of the outcome achieved by a lawyer is monotone in priority profile
improvements.
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of a lawyer. In doing so, we will follow closely the presentation in Sönmez
(2013).
Definition. A priority profile ≻ is an unambiguous improvement over another
priority profile ≻′ for lawyer i if:
- the ranking of i is at least as good under ≻ as under ≻′ for any court c,
- the ranking of i is strictly better under ≻ than under ≻′ for some court c,
- the relative ranking of other lawyers is the same under ≻ and ≻′ for any court
Intuitively, a priority profile improvement of some lawyer means that while
all other lawyers’ relative rankings among the courts are unchanged, the partic-
ular lawyer’s ranking is not worse at any court (i.e. there are at most as many
lawyers ranked higher than the lawyer as before) and the lawyer’s ranking has
improved at least at one court. Note that priority profile improvements include
improvements in grades, waiting time and social hardship criteria.
Definition. A mechanism ψ respects improvements if a lawyer never receives
a strictly worse assignment as a result of an unambiguous improvement in her
court priorities.
Respect of improvements is a natural property to ask for. Suppose that a
better grade for a lawyer leads to an unambiguous improvement in that lawyer’s
ranking. If respect of improvements did not hold, the lawyer would have re-
ceived a less preferred position than with the worse grade. This would run
counter to the view that law students should be rewarded for good performance
in the exams. In addition, some may consider it to be unjust that lawyers ob-
tain a better outcome for themselves despite having a worse grade, compared to
another lawyer. Similar arguments can be made for why a mechanism should
respect improvements in waiting time and social criteria.
More important, perhaps, is the implicit reliance of existing procedures on
waiting time in ranking lawyers. Suppose that under some specified mechanism
a lawyer improves her ranking by arriving earlier, then, if the mechanism tries to
aid lawyers who arrive early by improving their ranking, this attempt to increase
the welfare will hurt those lawyers if the overall mechanism does not respect
improvements.
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We next formalize the notion that whenever a position is not filled in some
period, then no agent who would have been available that period should be as-
signed later. It seems reasonable to suppose that policy-makers would not be
willing to allow some place at a court to go unfilled just to allow a current appli-
cant to obtain a better allocation. This is first because lawyers provide essential
work to the court at the time of their trainee-ship and second because in this
way more future slots are left open which makes future lawyers (weakly) better
off.36
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X satisfies early filling if there is no t ∈ T such
that there exists some c ∈C such that |{y ∈ Y : yT = t,yC = c}|< qc,t and there
exists some i ∈ I such that YT (i)> t. A mechanism ψ satisfies early filling if for
all P ∈ P , ψ(P) satisfies early filling.
Early filling appears similar in flavor to the notion of no wastefulness, which
is defined as:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X is wasteful if there exists a time t, a court c
and a lawyer i such that |{y ∈ Y : yT = t,yC = c}|< qc,t , Y (i) = /0 and (c, t)Pi /0.
Note that a Pareto efficient allocation is automatically non-wasteful. The
following example show that non-wasteful and early filling are logically inde-
pendent properties:
Example 1. There are three lawyers i1, i2, i3, two courts c1,c2 and two
time periods t = 1,2. Each court has a unit of capacity in each pe-
riod. All contracts are acceptable to all lawyers. The allocation
{(i1,c1,2),(i2,c2,2),(i3,c1,1)} satisfies non-wastefulness but violates early fill-
ing. The allocation {(i1, /0),(i2,c1,1),(i3,c2,1)} satisfies early filling but is
wasteful.
In fact there is a fundamental conflict between early filling and non-
wastefulness if it is additionally required that allocations are acceptable to the
lawyers.
36The notion of early filling requires that if positions are not taken in an early period, then no
agent should be allocated in a later period. It thus makes sense to require early filling only if one
interprets our model as involving a single cohort of students, rather than overlapping cohorts. In
an extended dynamic setting one should amend the definition of early filling to allow positions
to be empty even if a lawyer from a later generation takes a position at a later time. Early filling
would then only rule out lawyers from the cohort appearing at a time t to take positions after
that period if there are empty slots in t.
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Lemma 1. There is no mechanism that is individually rational, non-wasteful
and satisfies early filling.
Proof. Suppose ψ is an individually rational, non-wasteful mechanism. We
show that there is an instance of a lawyer-court matching with waiting times
problem in which this mechanism necessarily violates early filling. Consider
the following example. There are three lawyers i1, i2, i3, two courts c1,c2
and two time periods t = 1,2. Each court has a unit of capacity in each pe-
riod. The only acceptable contracts are: {(i1,c1,2),(i2,c2,2), (i3,c1,1)}. Then
Y ′= {(i1,c1,2),(i2,c2,2),(i3,c1,1)} is the unique individually rational and non-
wasteful allocation, which does not satisfy early-filling.
In the proof above, both individual rationality and non-wastefulness are re-
quired. Without individual rationality, one of the lawyers assigned in period
t = 2 could have been assigned to an (unacceptable) earlier position. Non-
wastefulness is required, since otherwise both lawyers allocated in period t = 2
could have been left unassigned.
Usually non-wastefulness is one of the most basic desirable properties that
a matching mechanism has to possess. In our application, not being assigned
in a particular federal state however likely is the result of having been accepted
elsewhere. Therefore, not being assigned appears to us not to harm lawyers to
an excessive extent since with a high probability they were accepted elsewhere.
Failing to satisfy early-filling can however have a detrimental effect on future
generations of lawyers.
4 Berlin Mechanism
We now study the procedure that is currently used in Germany to allocate
lawyers to courts, mostly adopting the myopic interpretation of our model.
Some aspects of that procedure are reasonably well documented, however the
part describing how lawyers are allocated to courts within a period is not. While
reported preferences, capacities and priorities are to be taken into account, there
is no description of how these are used to find the allocation within a period.
Another complication is that lawyers have many strategic options, in addition to
reporting preferences over courts. For example they can decide for what entry
date they wish to apply. They can refuse to accept an offer that has been made.
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They can report verifiable information about social status and other information
that affects the priorities they will have. Because of this complexity we decide to
model the procedure in a stylized manner that captures the most important fea-
tures shared by the different allocation procedures as discussed and referenced
in the Introduction.
The Berlin mechanism is a two-stage procedure. Lawyers are only able
to report a ranking over the courts and fix a particular entry date to which we
suppose the lawyers have applied.37 In each given time period, the first stage of
the procedure determines the set of lawyers to be considered in this time period,
while in the second stage these considered lawyers are matched to open court
positions.
The first-stage lawyer selection procedure in a given period is often de-
tailed in the relevant regulations, as discussed earlier. This lawyer selection
procedure can vary across federal states (see observations in the Introduction),
nevertheless in terms of our results, these details do not matter. The important
point that the lawyer selection procedure satisfies, is that it selects lawyers based
solely on observable characteristics such as grades, waiting time and social cri-
teria while ignoring preferences of the lawyers. We describe here a stylized
lawyer selection procedure, which takes as input λG,λW and λS, which are re-
spectively the share of positions to be assigned to lawyers based on grade, wait-
ing time and social hardship criteria. Let Qt = ∑
|C|
c=1 qc,t be the total capacity
of the courts in period t. For period t select the ⌊λSQt⌋ lawyers ranked highest
according to ≻S.38 Next, select the ⌊λGQt⌋ lawyers ranked highest according to
≻G. Finally, select the Qt −⌊λSQt⌋−⌊λGQt⌋ lawyers ranked highest according
to ≻W .39
For the second-stage allocation of lawyers to courts within a given period
we make the assumption that the lawyer-proposing deferred-acceptance algo-
37In Subsection 4.3 we study the question whether lawyers can strategically delay their appli-
cation.
38We define ⌊x⌋ to be the largest integer below x.
39Note that Qt −⌊λSQt⌋−⌊λGQt⌋ equals ⌊λW Qt⌋, thereby ensuring that a total of Qt lawyers
gets selected.
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rithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) is used.40 The DA algorithm works as fol-
lows, taking as input lawyers’ reported preferences and courts’ priority rankings
over lawyers:
• Step 1: Each lawyer applies to her preferred court. Each court considers
all applicants and tentatively accepts the ones it ranks highest up to its
capacity. All others are rejected.
• Step k: Any lawyer who was rejected by a court in the previous step
applies to her next most preferred acceptable court or, if all acceptable
courts have already rejected her, she is assigned the outside option. Each
court considers applicants it tentatively holds from the last step and those
who applied in step k and tentatively accepts the ones it ranks highest up
to its capacity. All others are rejected.
The DA algorithm eventually stops with all lawyers either assigned to a court
or the outside option. We summarize below a number of properties of the DA
mechanism that we will use throughout the paper.41
Theorem. (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) The Lawyer-Proposing
Deferred-Acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof.
Theorem. (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999) The Lawyer-Proposing Deferred-
Acceptance mechanism lacks justified envy and respects improvements.
Given the lawyer selection procedure and the DA algorithm, the Berlin
mechanism proceeds as follows, for ascending integers t = 1, ..., tmax:42
40If an unstable mechanism were used instead of the lawyer-proposing DA, then we would
immediately have the result that the Berlin mechanism cannot simultaneously satisfy individual
rationality, respect of improvements, non-wastefulness and lack of justified envy (see Balin-
ski and Sönmez (1999)). Making this assumption allows us to conclude that any deficiencies
we find are likely the result of the way the Berlin mechanism determines the time at which a
lawyer is allocated to a court. Consequently, this can be considered as the “most conservative”
assumption.
41Note that when discussing the elimination of justified envy under the DA mechanism we
refer to the standard definition of justified envy, which does depend on the rankings over grade,
waiting time and social criteria.
42We consider a stylized version of the Berlin mechanism. It does not allow lawyers who
could not be assigned at some period to later be allocated. Instead such lawyers are assigned
the outside option. We make this assumption here for simplicity. In practice, such lawyers may
be considered again by the mechanism in later rounds, with the caveat that they will not gain
waiting time following a rejection.
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First stage
• Step t.a: Select up to Qt lawyers from the set of lawyers that so far have
not been selected, according to the lawyer selection procedure.
Second stage
• Step t.b: Selected lawyers submit preferences over courts.43 Apply the
DA algorithm using submitted preferences of the lawyers who have so
far been selected in period t and on the courts’ priorities. Assign each
lawyer to the court assigned under this algorithm. If there are lawyers that
were assigned the outside option, go to step t.c. If there are no lawyers
that were assigned the outside option in this step, go to step (t + 1).a or
if t = tmax, end the procedure with all those who were not yet assigned a
court being assigned the outside option.
• Step t.c: Select as many additional lawyers from those not yet selected as
there are unassigned lawyers resulting in Step t.b. Repeat Step t.b with
those lawyers additionally selected and those that were assigned to a court
before.
Intuitively the Berlin mechanism tries to allocate lawyers to the earliest possible
period using the DA algorithm. If there are more lawyers than seats at courts
for the earliest period there is a first step that determines the set of lawyers to
be allocated to courts at the earliest date based on grades, waiting time and
social criteria. If at some point a lawyer is allocated to the outside option the
mechanism selects an additional lawyer to be allocated in the earliest possible
period. Once all positions in the earliest possible period have been filled, the
same process is repeated for the subsequent period. From the description of the
43In practice lawyers submit their ranking over courts the first time they apply for a position.
However it is conceivable that lawyers might contact the regional court of appeal to change
those submitted preferences. However if such behavior is infrequent it is sensible to assume that
preferences over courts are submitted only once by the lawyers. Some federal states explicitly
allow lawyers to change their ranking over courts until a position has been offered to them.
Allowing lawyers to submit their ranking over courts after the time at which they are allocated
has been determined simplifies the strategic analysis of the Berlin mechanism. Given that DA
is strategy-proof for lawyers, they will have an incentive to report their ranking over courts in a
way that is consistent with their preferences over courts and time, by reporting possibly different
rankings over courts for different periods.
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Berlin mechanism it follows that the allocation it produces is feasible and that
no lawyer receives an allocation that is worse than the outside option.
Lemma 2. The Berlin mechanism is individually rational and feasible.
In addition to the previous description of the allocation procedure, there are
some peculiarities that may affect its performance, which for now we abstract
from in the following theoretical discussion. First, truncated court preferences:
In some federal states only two more courts in addition to the most-preferred one
can be reported (sometimes with no ordering possible) and if the lawyer is not
allocated to any of these three, then her preference list is randomly filled with
non-listed courts.44 Second, endogenous court priorities: lawyers can report
a verifiable special social connection to some courts, e.g. a spouse or other
relatives living in that region etc., leading to higher priority at that court. Third,
refusals to accept positions: lawyers are informed of their allocated court, but
they can refuse to accept that position. Refusing lawyers are replaced by those
still on the waiting list. Usually, refusals lead to non-accrual of waiting time.
4.1 Deficiencies of the Berlin Mechanism
The algorithm as currently used has a number of flaws, mainly associated to the
fact that t-preferences are not considered when determining which lawyers are
to be allocated in a given time period. While lawyers are able to report different
rankings over courts for different periods, any information concerning the trade-
off between waiting and obtaining a better court is not used by the mechanism.
This has important implications for the efficiency of the mechanism.
Proposition 1. The Berlin mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient.
Proof. Consider the following example.
Example 2. C = {c1}, I = {i1, i2}, T = {1,2}, qc1,1 = qc1,2 = 1 and i1 ≻c1 i2.
But lawyers arrive in the first period and their preferences are (c1,2)Pi1(c1,1)
and (c1,1)Pi2(c1,2). Due to the two-stage procedure the higher ranked lawyer
i1 is considered for the first period, reports c1 as acceptable and is allocated.
44It is well known that the DA mechanism is more manipulable if lawyers report a ranking
over only k courts than if lawyers report a ranking over k′ > k courts, see Pathak and Sönmez
(2013).
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In period two i2 is selected and allocated. Then, the outcome of the Berlin
mechanism is {(i1,c1,1),(i2,c1,2)}, which is strictly worse for both lawyers
than {(i1,c1,2),(i2,c1,1)}.
Lack of weak Pareto efficiency means that under the Berlin mechanism there
could be situations under which every single lawyer could be made better off.
In the above example the inefficiency stems from the fact that the exogenous
lawyer selection procedure in effect determines the final allocation of lawyers
to courts. Since this allocation does not depend on lawyers’ preferences at all, it
is not surprising that there are many lawyers that could be made better off. We
have the following result.
Proposition 2. The Berlin mechanism does not eliminate justified envy and does
not respect improvements.
Proof. Consider the following lawyer assignment problem.
Example 3.
[Berlin mechanism does not eliminate justified envy] There are two periods, t =
1,2. We have three lawyers I = {i1, i2, i3} and two courts C = {c1,c2}. qc1,1 =





In period 1, in the first stage the two lawyers with highest priority (i1 and i2),
regardless of their preferences, are selected to be allocated to the two open
spots in the first period. Lawyer i3 is put on hold, increases her waiting time,
and will be reconsidered in the next period. In the second stage of period 1
lawyers can report their preferences considering only contracts for this time
period t = 1. Based on these preferences, i1 and i2 are matched to their favorite
courts, respecting their priority, and using the deferred acceptance mechanism.
In period 2, there is only i3 who is then allocated.
Therefore the Berlin mechanism produces the following (unique) outcome
XBerlin = {(i1,c1,1),(i2,c2,1),(i3,c1,2)} for all c ∈C. This outcome is not fair
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since there exists justified envy of i2, i.e. (c1,2)Pi2(c2,1), although i2 ≻c i3.
45
[Berlin mechanism does not respect improvements] Consider the previous





i2, then the resulting allocation under the Berlin mechanism is X
∗ =
{(i1,c1,1),(i2,c1,2),(i3,c2,1)}. If i2 improves, e.g. with a better grade, such
that the old priority ranking, ≻, is recovered, then XBerlin would result and i2
would be worse off. Hence the algorithm does not respect improvements.
Finally, we show that the Berlin mechanism may be wasteful.
Proposition 3. The Berlin mechanism is wasteful.
Proof. Consider the following lawyer assignment problem.
Example 4. Suppose there are three lawyers i1, i2 and i3, two courts c1,c2 and
two time periods t = 1,2. Each court has one unit of capacity in each time pe-
riod. All courts rank lawyers the same: i1 ≻c i2 ≻c i3. Lawyers i1 and i3 are
strictly impatient and prefer c1 over c2 in both periods. Lawyer i2 is (strictly) im-
patient and finds only c1 acceptable. Then the outcome of the Berlin mechanism
under truth-telling is: Y ′ = {(i1,c1,1),(i2, /0),(i3,c2,1)}. Note that because i2
does not find (c1,1) acceptable, he is assigned the outside option in t = 1. This
is wasteful since court c1 has an empty position in period t = 2 which lawyer i2
prefers to being unassigned.
Note that Proposition 3 is a corollary of Lemma 1 which shows that no
individually rational mechanism is both non-wasteful and fills positions early
and Proposition 6, which shows that the Berlin mechanism fills positions early.
4.2 Desirable Properties of the Berlin Mechanism
We have seen that the Berlin mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not
eliminate justified envy, does not respect improvements and further is wasteful
for general preferences. One question that could be considered is whether there
45Note that the allocation X∗ = {(i1,c1,1),(i2,c1,2),(i3,c2,1)} is preferred by i2 and i3 and
weakly preferred by i1 to XBerlin and hence Pareto dominates it, despite equal courts’ rankings
of lawyers.
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exists a class of preferences for which the Berlin mechanism eliminates justi-
fied envy and respects improvements. As it turns out for preferences which are
strictly impatient the currently used allocation procedure always delivers an al-
location without justified envy and respects improvements. This is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose the preferences of each lawyer are strictly impatient
and all contracts are acceptable to all lawyers and courts. Then the Berlin
mechanism eliminates justified envy.
Proof. Suppose first lawyers are strictly impatient, all contracts are acceptable
to all lawyers and courts and that the Berlin mechanism does not eliminate jus-
tified envy. Then there exist lawyers i1, i2, contracts x,y resulting in the Berlin
mechanism with xI = i1 and yI = i2 such that yPix and i1 ≻xC i2, i1 ≻G i2,
i1 ≻W i2, and i1 ≻S i2. Since all contracts are acceptable we have that x 6= /0.
Since i1 is higher ranked than i2 in terms of grade, waiting time and social
criteria, the Berlin mechanism must yield contracts such that yT ≥ xT . Strict
impatience rules out that yT > xT , as otherwise i1 would not prefer y to x. Thus
we have yT = xT . But in period xT the deferred-acceptance algorithm is used,
which is known to eliminate justified envy. This contradicts i1 ≻xC i2.
Note that we need that all lawyer find every court acceptable. If this were not
the case, it could happen that lawyer i is selected for a period earlier than lawyer
j, but left unassigned. This can happen if there are some courts that lawyer i
finds unacceptable and if j later obtains a position at a court that is acceptable.
While this result is somewhat encouraging, one should note that in practice it is
not obvious that lawyers have preferences that are strictly impatient and find all
courts acceptable, which we have already argued does not appear likely.
Unfortunately the above logic cannot be used to show that under strict im-
patience and acceptability of all contracts, the Berlin mechanism respects im-
provements. To see this, consider the following example:
Example 5. I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}, C = {c1,c2}, t = 1,2 and qc1,1 =
qc2,1 = qc1,2 = qc2,2 = 1. Preferences of the lawyers are given by
(c1,1)Pi(c2,1)Pi(c1,2)Pi(c2,2) for all i ∈ I. There are two priority profiles, ≻
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and ≻̃, given by:
≻c1: i3, i2, i1, i4
≻c2: i1, i2, i3, i4
≻G: i1, i2, i3, i4
≻W : i2, i3, i4, i1
and
≻̃c1 : i3, i2, i1, i4
≻̃c2 : i1, i2, i3, i4
≻̃G : i2, i1, i3, i4
≻̃W : i2, i3, i4, i1
Note that the priorities only differ in that i2 has a better grade under ≻̃. We
consider a lawyer selection procedure with λG = 0.5 and λW = 0.5. As λS = 0
by implication, the lawyer selection procedure first selects the lawyer ranked
highest according to grade and the highest ranked remaining lawyer according
to waiting time. Hence under ≻ lawyers i1 and i2 are selected and lawyer i2
gets (c1,1). Under ≻̃ lawyers i2 and i3 are selected. So i2 gets (c2,1) under ≻̃,
meaning that the improvement in the ranking of lawyer i2 has made her worse
off, despite the fact that all agents have strictly impatient preferences.
For the Berlin mechanism to respect improvements we need a further as-
sumption: namely that a single ranking determines which lawyers are allocated
for each period.
Proposition 5. Suppose the preferences of each lawyer are strictly impatient,
all contracts are acceptable to all lawyers and courts and λG = 1. Then the
Berlin mechanism respects improvements.
Proof. Let ≻̃ be an unambiguous improvement over ≻ for lawyer i and let x, x̃
be the respective assignments obtained under the Berlin mechanism. For a con-
tradiction suppose xPix̃. There are three cases. First, suppose xT > x̃T . By the
Berlin mechanism and all contracts being acceptable there is a constant number
Qt = ∑c qc,t of agents allocated in period t, which are the ∑
t−1
s=1 Qs+1 to ∑
t
s=1 Qs
highest ranked agents according to either ≻G or ≻̃G. Since ≻̃ is an unambiguous
improvement, we must have x̃T ≥ xT , a contradiction. Second, suppose x̃ = /0.
From xPix̃ it follows that x 6= /0. But since all contracts are acceptable, i under
≻̃G cannot be ranked higher than ∑
tmax
s=1 Qs. But then it must be ranked even
lower under ≻G implying that x = /0, a contradiction. Third, suppose xT = x̃T .
But the deferred-acceptance algorithm satisfies respect of improvements, which
contradicts xPix̃.
The Berlin mechanism in Step 1a selects Q1 lawyers to be allocated via the
deferred acceptance algorithm to positions in period t = 1. For each unfilled
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position, another lawyer is selected. Hence either the position will be filled and
the algorithm moves to the next period or all remaining lawyers consider the
unfilled position to be unacceptable. In the former case the algorithm fills all
position for period t = 1. In the latter case it does not fill all positions in period
t = 1 but all lawyers have been assigned to either a position or the outside option.
Hence in that case no lawyer will be allocated to a later period. This argument
can be extended to any subsequent period, so that either all positions for that
period are filled or no positions in subsequent periods are filled. As a result,
the final assignment obtained by the Berlin mechanism fills positions early. We
summarize this finding in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The Berlin mechanism fills positions early.
One of the deficiencies of the Berlin mechanism was that it sometimes
wasted positions. If we require all lawyers to find all positions acceptable, then
this is no longer the case.
Proposition 7. If all agents find all contracts acceptable, then the Berlin mech-
anisms is non-wasteful.
Proof. Let Y ′ be the outcome of the Berlin mechanism for some lawyer-court
matching with waiting time problem. Suppose that some lawyer i is not assigned
under the Berlin mechanism, but that there exists c, t such that |{y ∈ Y ′|yC =
c,yT = t}|< qc,t . By assumption we have that (c, t)Pi /0. Note that i cannot have
been selected at a step t ′ ≥ t, since the fact that there was an empty position
at court c for time t implies that more lawyers would have been selected until
all positions in period t were filled. In particular, i would have been selected
eventually. But then, since i finds (c, t) acceptable, i would have been assigned
to it in that step. Hence i must have been selected earlier. Furthermore, i cannot
have been selected in step t ′ < t. If i had been selected, i would have been
assigned since i finds all courts acceptable. Hence we have a contradiction.
4.3 Strategic Delay under the Berlin Mechanism
So far we have mainly adopted the myopic interpretation: there is a single cohort
of lawyers who simultaneously apply for positions for their legal trainee-ship.
This effectively assumes that all lawyers need to apply at the same time. How-
ever the Berlin mechanism may lead to incentives for strategically delaying an
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application. For simplicity, we again abstract away from future generations of
lawyers, but allow lawyers to choose the time at which they submit their appli-
cation. Note that the Berlin mechanism, by its nature, can accommodate agents
submitting preferences at various points in time. We adapt the Berlin mecha-
nism by inserting at the very beginning of the Berlin mechanism a step 0, in
which each lawyer reports a desired starting time τi ∈ T .
The difference to before is that in each period only those lawyers who wished
to be allocated before or in that period are considered in the lawyer selection pro-
cedure. Under the Berlin mechanism with reports of starting time, the strategy
of each lawyer is now a starting time τi as well as her preferences over courts
for each period.
The following example shows that agents may have an incentive to delay
submitting their preferences:
Proposition 8. Under the Berlin mechanism, agents have incentives for delay-
ing their application.
Proof. Consider the following example.
Example 6. There are two periods, t = 1,2. We have lawyers I = {i1, i2, i3}.
There are two courts, i.e. C = {c1,c2}. qc1,1 = qc1,2 = qc2,1 = 1 and qc2,2 =
0. Court (as well as grade, waiting time and social) priorities are i1 ≻c i2 ≻c




If all lawyers submit their desired starting time τi = 1, the resulting allocation
is {(i1,c1,1), (i2,c2,1),(i3,c1,2)}. However if lawyer i2 instead reports τ2 = 2,
the outcome of the Berlin mechanism is {(i1,c1,1),(i2,c1,2),(i3,c2,1)}, which
is preferred by lawyer i2 to the outcome from applying in period t = 1. Therefore,
lawyer i2 has an incentive to delay her application.
In practice, incentives for strategic delay may be muted by the (uncertain)
arrival of future generations of lawyers. If there are sufficiently many highly
ranked future generations of lawyers arriving in period t = 2, then by delaying
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her application, agent i2 might not be assigned at all or later. The motivation of
delaying the application in this example is for strategic reasons: it allows lawyer
i2 to obtain a more preferred allocation. In practice students might also wish to
delay their entry date for non-strategic reasons. This could happen when they
wish to do a PhD or a masters degree before starting their trainee-ship. In such
cases the lawyers would have a preference of starting late.
Allowing lawyers to choose the time period in which they apply may alle-
viate some concerns regarding the negative properties of the Berlin mechanism.
However the following example shows that there are equilibria under the Berlin
mechanism that are not weakly Pareto efficient.
Proposition 9. There are Nash equilibrium outcomes under the Berlin mecha-
nism with strategic delay that are weakly Pareto inefficient.
Proof. Consider the following example.
Example 7. C = {c1,c2}, I = {i1, i2}, qc1,1 = qc2,2 = 1, qc1,2 = qc2,1 = 0 and
i1 ≻c1 i2, i2 ≻c2 i1 and i1 ≻G i2 and λG = 1. Preferences are: (c2,2)Pi1(c1,1)
and (c1,1)Pi2(c2,2). Let τ1,τ2 ∈ {1,2} be the desired starting dates of the
two lawyers, respectively. Note that reported preferences over courts are
not relevant in this example. Then {(τ1 = 1),(τ2 = 2)} is a Nash equilib-
rium strategy profile. The outcome associated with this strategy profile is
{(i1,c1,1),(i2,c2,2)}. To see that this strategy profile is indeed a Nash equilib-
rium, suppose i1 deviated to report τ1 = 2. Then no lawyer would be allocated
in the first period. In the second period, lawyer i2 would still be allocated to
c2 due to her higher priority at the court. Lawyer i1 would be left unallocated.
Hence i1 does not gain from this deviation. Next suppose i2 deviates to report
τ2 = 1. Then only i1 is selected to be allocated in the first period, while i2 is still
allocated in the second period. Hence i2 is indifferent. Thus {(t1 = 1),(t2 = 2)}
constitutes a Nash equilibrium. To see that this is not Pareto efficient, note that
if i1 and i2 switched allocations such that {(i1,c2,2),(i2,c1,1)}, both would be
better off.
Note however that there are multiple equilibria in the example we consid-
ered. For example the profile {(τ1 = 2),(τ2 = 1)} would result in a Pareto
efficient Nash equilibrium outcome in the example used above.
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5 Stable Mechanisms
5.1 Choice Functions and their Properties
In the previous section we have seen that the currently employed procedure
of allocating lawyers to their trainee-ships has some serious deficiencies. In
this section we propose a procedure which overcomes these problems. Our
approach is to first take the court (or grade, waiting time and social) priorities
as used in the current procedure and then to construct choice functions, as in
the matching with contracts literature. Having constructed the choice functions
we can then use the cumulative offer process of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) to
find a stable allocation. Specifying appropriate choice functions for the lawyers
does not present a difficulty since a lawyer will simply choose her most preferred
contract from the set of available contracts. The choice functions for the courts
are somewhat harder to define.
We will denote general choice functions of some agent j ∈ I ∪C as Ch j
which associates for each offer set Y ⊆ X some contracts involving j. When we
write Chi(Y ) then the choice function of an agent i ∈ I from the offer set Y is
meant, whereas Chc(Y ) denotes the choice function of a court c ∈ C from the
offer set. A lawyer i’s choice function Chi(Y ) specifies for each set of contracts




The above formulation says that lawyer i will choose from set Y the contract
naming lawyer i that is maximal according to the lawyer’s preferences Pi. If Y
does not contain a contract with i then Chi(Y ) = /0.
While there are many possible choice functions that are conceivable for the
courts, we restrict attention to slot-specific choice functions as in Kominers and
Sönmez (2016). Each court c has a set Sc of slots where |Sc| = ∑t∈T qc,t . Each
slot s ∈ Sc has an associated priority ordering Πsc over the set of contracts in-
volving court c, where we denote the profile of slot-specific priority orderings
of court c by Πc =∪s∈ScΠ
s
c. In our setting it is natural to suppose that each court
has qc,t slots of type t. We let Stc be the set of slots of type t and thus we have
Sc = ∪t∈T S
t
c. Furthermore for each court c there is a precedence order ⊲c over
slots in Sc. The interpretation of ⊲c is that for slots s,s′ ∈ Sc if s ⊲c s′ then slot s
31
is filled before slot s′, where we make precise what filling a slot before another
one means below. Given the slot-specific priorities and the precedence order
over slots, a court’s slot-specific choice function Chc(Y ;⊲c,Πc) is constructed
as follows. Consider slots in order of their precedence ⊲c. Each slot s chooses
its most preferred contract according to Πsc from those contracts that have been
offered and are not yet associated to any lawyer chosen by any slot with higher
precedence.
For court c the model set-up does not prescribe a unique slot-specific choice
function that is consistent with the priority ≻c and the time-specific capacity
constraints. While we know a court’s priority ordering over lawyers and its
capacity constraints qc,t , this does not imply a single slot-specific choice func-
tion. There are potentially many different slot-specific choice functions, differ-
ing both in the precedence order ⊲c as well as in the slot priority orders Πs. We
introduce below the time-specific choice function Chtsc (·)=Chc(·;⊲
ts,Π(≻c)),
for which each slot of type t finds only contracts involving period t acceptable
and ranks acceptable contracts according to the court’s priority ordering ≻c.46
The precedence order ⊲ts is such that any slot of type t has precedence over any
slot of type t ′ if t < t ′, i.e. for all s ∈ Stc and s
′ ∈ St
′
c such that t < t
′ we have
s ⊲ts s′. Slots of the same type can be ordered arbitrarily without loss of gener-
ality since their priority orderings are identical. The reason for referring to this
as the time-specific choice function is that it makes choices of contracts based
on constraints, which specify for each time period the number of contracts that
can be held. For any set of available contracts Y the choice of court c from Y ,
Chtsc (Y ), is thus given by the following procedure:
• Step 0: Reject all contracts y ∈ Y with yC 6= c.
• Step t ∈ {1, ..., tmax} : Consider contracts y ∈ Y with yT = t. Accept one
by one contracts of the highest priority lawyers according to ≻c until qc,t
contracts have been accepted. If a contract of lawyer yI has been accepted,
reject all other contracts y′ with y′I = yI . Once qc,t contracts have been
accepted, reject all other contracts y with yT = t. If there are no contracts
which have not yet been considered, end the algorithm. Unless t = tmax
move to the next step t +1. If t = tmax end the algorithm.
46Since each lawyer has only one contract available for each period, this completely deter-
mines the slot’s priority ordering.
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We will make use of the following definitions of unilateral and bilateral substi-
tutes from Hatfield and Kojima (2010):
Definition. Contracts are unilateral substitutes for court c if there do not exist
contracts x,z∈X and a set of contracts Y ⊆X such that zI /∈YI , z /∈Chc (Y ∪{z})
and z ∈ Chc (Y ∪{x,z}).
Consider a situation in which for some lawyer i there is only one contract,
say z, in the available set of a court that is not chosen by the court. Then the
choice function of the court satisfies unilateral substitutes if and only if that
contract is also not chosen when some other contract, say x, is added to the
available set.
Definition. Contracts are bilateral substitutes for court c if there do not ex-
ist contracts x,z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that zI,xI /∈ YI , z /∈
Chc (Y ∪{z}) and z ∈ Chc (Y ∪{x,z}).
Bilateral substitutes is a less strict requirement on choice functions. Con-
sider a situation in which for some lawyer i there is only one contract, z, in the
available set, that is not chosen by the court. Then consider adding another con-
tract, x, to the available set, such that the lawyer of that new contract did not
previously have a contract in the available set. The court’s choice function sat-
isfies bilateral substitutes if and only if the contract z of lawyer i is still rejected
out of the larger set of available contracts.
The following irrelevance of rejected contracts property as defined by Aygün
and Sönmez (2012) will be needed:
Definition. Choice functions satisfy irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) for
court c if for all Y ⊂ X and for all z ∈ X \Y , we have z /∈ Chc (Y ∪{z}) implies
Chc (Y ) = Chc (Y ∪{z}).
Irrelevance of rejected contracts simply means that the availability of con-
tracts which are not chosen does not matter for choices.
Although we will rely on the results of Kominers and Sönmez (2016) to es-
tablish strategy-proofness of the cumulative offer process for a particular choice
function, other choice functions that we introduce in this paper satisfy the law
of aggregate demand, first introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005):
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Definition. The choice function of court c ∈ C satisfies the law of aggregate
demand if for all X ′ ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ X, |Chc (X ′)| ≤ |Chc (X ′′)|.
The law of aggregate demand intuitively says that when more contracts are
available to a court, then the court does not choose to accept fewer contracts.
We can now state Lemma 3:
Lemma 3. (Kominers and Sönmez, 2016) The time-specific choice functions
satisfy bilateral substitutes and IRC.
In general, Kominers and Sönmez (2016) have shown that slot-specific
choice functions satisfy neither unilateral substitutes nor the law of aggregate
demand. However since we consider a particular slot-specific choice function it
could potentially satisfy these conditions. However the next two examples show
that this is not the case.
Example 8. Let T = {1,2}, Y = {(i2,c,2)} and x = (i2,c,1), z = (i1,c,2).
Furthermore let i2 ≻c i1 and qc,1 = qc,2 = 1. Then we have under a time-
specific choice function z /∈ Chtsc (Y ∪{z}) = {(i2,c,2)}. However we have
z ∈ Chtsc (Y ∪{x,z}) = {(i2,c,1),(i1,c,2)}, which contradicts unilateral substi-
tutes.
Example 9. Let Y = {(i1,c,1),(i2,c,2)}, i2 ≻c i1 and qc,1 = qc,2 = 1. Then we
have Chtsc (Y ) = {(i1,c,1),(i2,c,2)}) but we also have Ch
ts
c (Y ∪{(i2,c,1)}) =
{(i2,c,1)}. Hence adding the contract (i2,c,1) to the set of contracts Y reduces
the total number of contracts chosen.47
The unilateral substitutes as well as the law of aggregate demand condition
is used by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012) to prove
(group) strategy-proofness and the rural hospitals theorem for the cumulative
offer process. The unilateral substitutes condition is also used to show the exis-
tence of a doctor-optimal stable matching. Nevertheless we are able to show that
despite of the failure of the unilateral substitutes condition, this result continues
to hold in our model. The key to this result is to assume that the preferences
of lawyers satisfy the weak impatience property. With that property a situation
such as the one in the example above cannot arise. There we had that a contract
47We thank Christian Basteck for this example and for correcting a previously incorrect
lemma.
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of lawyer i2 for a late period was available without contracts of the same lawyer
for all earlier time periods being available. Adding one of these earlier time
periods then caused lawyer i1 to be accepted when i1 was previously rejected.
If lawyers however propose early contracts before later ones, such a situation
cannot arise in the cumulative offer process.
To discuss elimination of justified envy, we follow Sönmez (2013) in defin-
ing fairness of a choice function.48
Definition. For any court c, choice function Chc is fair if for any set of contracts
Y ⊆ X, and any pair of contracts x,y ∈ Y with xC = yC = c, yI ≻c xI , yT = xT
and x ∈ Chc(Y ), then there exists z ∈ Chc(Y ) such that zI = yI .
In words, a choice functions of a court is fair if it chooses one lawyer’s
contract but not another lawyer’s contract, although the latter enjoys a higher
priority at that court, this can only be if the latter lawyer has another contract
which is chosen by that court. We then have the following Lemma 4:
Lemma 4. The time-specific choice function Chtsc is fair.
We now define stability, the central concept of the two-sided matching liter-
ature since Gale and Shapley (1962).
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X̃ is stable with respect to choice functions
(Chc)
|C|
c=1 if we have:
1. individual rationality: Chi(Y ) = Y (i) for all i ∈ I and Chc = Y (c) for all
c ∈C; and
2. there is no court c ∈ C and a blocking set Y ′ 6= Chc(Y ) such that Y ′ =
Chc(Y ∪Y ′) and Y ′RiY for all i ∈ Y ′I .
Hence an allocation is stable if each lawyer prefers the assignment to being al-
located no contract, each court chooses its assignment over some subset of that
assignment and there is no set of contracts such that a court would rather choose
that set of contract, the blocking set, when this and the allocation are available,
such that the lawyers having contracts in the blocking set weakly prefer those
contracts over their assignment. Under the assumption that courts use the time-
specific choice function Chtsc (·) stable allocations are feasible. Stability is not
48Note that this is a different concept from fairness of an allocation.
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a desiderata per se in our model. In the original literature on two-sided match-
ings stability was seen as important in explaining whether matching procedures
would systematically lead to unraveling (Roth, 1984, 1991). In our case the
regional courts are not strategic players and the priorities according to which
they evaluate lawyers are determined by the mechanism designer. This pre-
cludes the possibility of courts contracting with lawyers around the centralized
mechanism. However, stability matters in our context as stability implies other
desirable properties of mechanisms. An allocation Y ⊆ X̃ is the lawyer-optimal
stable allocation if every lawyer weakly prefers it to any other stable allocation.
5.2 Cumulative Offer Process
We now introduce the cumulative offer process (COP) as defined in Hatfield
and Kojima (2010), which is a generalization of the deferred-acceptance algo-
rithm of Gale and Shapley (1962).
The cumulative offer process takes as input the (reported) preferences of the
lawyers as well as the choice function of each court.
• Step 1: One (arbitrarily chosen) lawyer offers her first choice contract x1.
The court that is offered the contract, c1 = (x1)C, holds the contract if it is
acceptable and rejects it otherwise. Let Ac1(1) = {x1}, and Ac(1) = /0 for
all c 6= c1.
In general,
• Step k ≥2: One of the lawyers for whom no contract is currently held
by any court offers her most preferred contract, say xk, that has not been
rejected in previous steps. Let ck = (xk)C, hold Chc (Ack(k−1)∪{xk})
and reject all other contracts. Let Ack(k) = Ack(k−1)∪{xk} and Ac(k) =
Ac(k−1) for all c 6= ck.
Now we apply Theorem 1 of Hatfield and Kojima (2010) to show that the cu-
mulative offer process, as just described, in conjunction with the time-specific
choice function produces a stable allocation.
Theorem. [Hatfield and Kojima (2010)] Suppose the choice functions of the
court used in the cumulative offer process satisfy bilateral substitutes. Then the
cumulative offer process produces a stable allocation.
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The existence of a stable matching is the minimum requirement that we ask
of an algorithm. By the above result and the fact that the time-specific choice
functions satisfy bilateral substitutes, using the time-specific choice functions
when running the COP yields a stable allocation. Hatfield and Kojima (2010)
further show that if one strengthens the assumptions to unilateral substitutes for
the choice functions used, then one can show that the cumulative offer process
produces the lawyer-optimal stable allocation. In our case however the time-
specific choice functions do not satisfy unilateral substitutes.
Nevertheless one can adapt Theorem 4 of Hatfield and Kojima (2010), as
modified by Aygün and Sönmez (2012), which is used in Theorem 5 of Hatfield
and Kojima (2010) to show the existence of a lawyer-optimal stable allocation
(doctor-optimal in their terminology). To do so, it is sufficient to make an as-
sumption on the preferences of the lawyers, rather than on the choice functions
used by the courts. Namely we will assume that lawyers are weakly impatient.
Previous results in the matching with contracts literature usually proceeded by
restricting the choice functions used by the side of the market which could ac-
cept multiple contracts to obtain results, while placing essentially no restrictions
on the other side of the market. Here we depart from this approach and relax the
restrictions placed on the choice functions used by the side of the market which
can accept several contracts (the courts) and instead put some restrictions on the
single-contract side (lawyers) of the market. Both approaches, as we will see,
lead to similar results.
Lemma 5. A contract z that is rejected by a court c at any step of the cumulative
offer process using the time-specific choice function Chtsc , cannot be held by
court c in any subsequent step.
The key to our proof of this result lies in the specific choice function that we
use. This causes lawyers, when a contract of theirs is rejected, to either propose
to a new court or to propose to some court at which the lawyer was previously
rejected. So if some court c has multiple offers, say z and z′ of some lawyer i and
holds z, then it will, when receiving a new contract offer from some other lawyer
j, never reject z while simultaneously accepting z′. In the proof we heavily rely
on Aygün and Sönmez (2012).
With this result in hand, we can now state the following lemma:
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Lemma 6. Suppose lawyer preferences are weakly impatient. The outcome of
the cumulative offer process using the time-specific choice function Chtsc pro-
duces the lawyer-optimal stable allocation.
The proof is essentially the same proof as the one of the corresponding Theo-
rem 5 in Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012). Assuming
weak impatience again allows us to relax the unilateral substitutes assumption
and instead use the time-specific choice functions which only satisfy the bilat-
eral substitutes assumption. The reason that this works is that because of weak
impatience, any sets of available contracts that the courts will have to make
choices from are sets such that if a contract x of some lawyer i is available for pe-
riod t, then contracts for any earlier and feasible period for that lawyer i will also
be available. On this restricted domain of sets of available contracts unilateral
substitutes essentially holds for the time-specific choice function, allowing the
proofs by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) to go through, with some modifications.
Note that we only needed to make use of the assumption of weak impatience for
proving Lemma 6.
The result in Lemma 6 is a new result, which is not implied by any of the
results in Kominers and Sönmez (2016), since they consider more general slot-
specific choice functions than we do here. For general slot-specific choice func-
tions a lawyer-optimal stable allocation is not guaranteed to exist and even when
such an allocation exists, the COP is not guaranteed to find it. Lemma 6 above
shows that under weak impatience, a lawyer-optimal stable allocation is guaran-
teed to exist and that it is found by the COP. The following example shows that
without weak impatience, the existence of a lawyer-optimal stable allocation is
no longer guaranteed.
Example 10. Let i1 and i2 prefer (c,2) to (c,1) and assume i1 ≻ i2 with
qc,1 = qc,2 = 1. Then the allocation Y = {(i1,c,1),(i2,c,2)} is stable, while
the COP produced the also stable allocation Y ′ = {(i1,c,2),(i2,c,1)}. Notice
that i2 prefers Y , while i1 prefers Y
′, i.e. neither allocation is weakly Pareto
efficient.
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5.3 Properties of the Time-specific Lawyer Offering Stable
Mechanism
The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism (TSLOSM), ψ ts, is defined
to be that mechanism which associates with each preference profile the outcome
of the COP using the time-specific choice functions. We will refer to this mech-
anism as the time-specific stable mechanism. We have the following result:
Proposition 10. The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism is stable
and (group) strategy-proof. If in addition lawyers’ preferences are weakly im-
patient, then the time-specific stable mechanism is lawyer-optimal stable.
Stability and (group) strategy-proofness follow directly from Theorem 3
in Kominers and Sönmez (2016). The second part follows from applying our
Lemma 6. Instead of applying Theorem 3 in Kominers and Sönmez (2016), an
alternative way of obtaining the first part of the above results when lawyers’
preferences are weakly impatient is to adapt results in Hatfield and Kojima
(2009) making use of the fact that under weak impatience, a lawyer-optimal
stable allocation is guaranteed to exist. An important corollary of the time-
specific stable mechanism being group strategy-proof is that it leads to weak
Pareto efficiency as in Hatfield and Kojima (2009).
Corollary 1. The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism is weakly
Pareto efficient.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Hence there exists an allocation Y ⊆ X such that
for all i ∈ I we have Y (i)PIψ ts(P). Let P̃i be the preference profile for each
lawyer i ∈ I that lists Y (i) as the only acceptable contract. Then we have that
ψ ts(P̃) = Y . This implies that we have found a coalition of lawyers, namely all
lawyers, that can jointly deviate to make all its member strictly better off. This
contradicts ψ ts being group strategy-proof.
One of the problems in the current procedure, the Berlin mechanism, is that
lawyers may be worse off by improving their ranking, for example by obtaining
a better grade or having waited longer. The next proposition shows that this
is not the case for the cumulative offer process using the time-specific choice
function.
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Proposition 11. The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism respects
improvements.
The intuition behind the proof of this result, which is simply an application
of Theorem 4 in Kominers and Sönmez (2016), is as follows. Let ≻1 be an
unambiguous improvement over ≻2 for lawyer i and let ψ1 be the associated
mechanism. Similarly for ≻2. Suppose the COP were run initially excluding
lawyer i under ≻1, which will lead to some allocation X1. After this, lawyer i
proposes contracts in order of preference. This process will terminate for some
contract offer xk, which is i’s assignment under the mechanism ψ1. Running
the algorithm under ≻2 without lawyer i will lead to the same initial allocation
X1 since only the ranking of lawyer i has changed. Letting i propose contracts
however will lead to the same rejections occurring since ≻1 is an unambiguous
improvement over ≻2 until xk is offered by i, which by assumption is the final
allocation under ≻1 but which may nevertheless be rejected under ≻2. From this
it follows that i cannot do worse under ≻1 than under ≻2. Note that the priorities
based on grades, accumulated waiting time and social criteria do not directly
enter the time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism. Hence changes in
those rankings will leave the outcome of the mechanism unchanged, which is
consistent with respect of improvements.
This is an important result since it implies that targeted efforts to improve
the allocation obtained by specific lawyers through an improvement of their
ranking can never hurt these lawyers who those efforts are intended to help.
One implication is that when the ranking depends positively on grades, then
lawyers are rewarded for better grades by an improvement in their assignment.
The fact that the time-specific stable mechanism respects improvements has
a further implication in our application. Lawyers, in the current system, may
report to have a special social relationship to a court. For example, having chil-
dren grants higher priority for regional courts in Bavaria, as discussed above.
Consider now a game which first asks lawyers to report any such information.
In a second stage, the priorities of each court would be adjusted to reflect those
reports, in case the information lawyers have reported has been verified. In
case lawyers do have special social relationship to a court, but do not report
it, the choice function remains unaffected. Then we have the following result,
which follows by noting that reporting this information leads to an unambigu-
ous improvement in the priority of a lawyer at a court. Since the time-specific
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stable mechanism respects improvements, reporting this information, holding
the strategies of everyone else fixed, cannot make a lawyer worse off, but may
lead to an improvement. Hence the following corollary is obtained:
Corollary 2. Each lawyer has an incentive to report verifiable information in-
creasing her priority at a court under the time-specific stable mechanism.
The above corollary shows that respect of improvements is closely linked
to the incentive compatibility of revealing hard information.49 Another desir-
able property that the time-specific stable mechanism satisfies is elimination of
justified envy.
Proposition 12. The time-specific stable mechanism eliminates justified envy.
Proof. To see that the time-specific stable mechanism eliminates justified envy,
let x,y ∈Y ⊆ X̃ be two contracts obtained by the time-specific stable mechanism
such that xI 6= yI and (xC,xT )PyI(yC,yT ). Then since by the cumulative offer
process yI must have offered (yI,xC,xT ) at some step during the process, it must
have been rejected. But the only way that (yI,xC,xT ) had been rejected while
x was accepted is when xI ≻xC yI , which implies that the time-specific stable
mechanism eliminates justified envy.
The time-specific mechanism proposed in this section however does not fill
positions early. The reason is an inherent conflict between stability and early
filling. To see this consider the following example.
Example 11. There are two periods t = 1,2 and two courts c =c1,c2, each with
one position in each period. In the first period, there are two lawyers I = {i1, i2},
with common preferences for each i ∈ I: (c1,1)Pi(c1,2)Pi(c2,1)Pi(c2,2). Both
courts have priorities such that lawyer i1 ≻c i2. The outcome of the cumulative
offer process using the time-specific choice function results in the allocation
{(i1,c1,1) ,(i2,c1,2)}, which leaves the position in period 1 at court c2 unoc-
cupied even though lawyer i2 is given a position in period 2, thereby violating
early filling.
49Aygün and Bo (2013) in their analysis of college admissions with affirmative action in
Brazil study the incentives of different disadvantaged groups to disclose their status to the mech-
anism. For example, it is desired by the policy-makers in Brazil that students from ethnic mi-
norities who went to a public high school are given higher priority. However such students may
decide not to reveal their status as an ethnic minority. In the currently used procedure in Brazil
they sometimes do not have an incentive to do so. The mechanism proposed by Aygün and Bo
(2013) makes it optimal for students to reveal this information truthfully.
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The example shows that (lawyer-optimal) stable outcomes might not satisfy
the early filling properties. There is a trade-off between preferences of lawyers
from different time periods: On the one hand, a mechanism finding a stable
outcome over lawyers from all periods might not fill positions early and by this
make future lawyers worse off. On the other hand, guaranteeing early filling
could benefit future lawyers at the costs of earlier lawyers, but would not be
stable and might violate other desirable properties, such as strategy-proofness.
5.4 Flexible Choice Functions
The discussion in the previous sections assumed that each court c could only
accept qc,t lawyers in time period t. This assumption was made because the
number of positions at each court is determined by the budget of the federal
state several periods into the future so that the courts cannot flexibly set their
own capacity for each period. In this subsection we consider the possibility of
allowing each court to flexibly determine how to allocate total capacity, which
is assumed to be fixed over several periods. Hence, we no longer have a time-
specific capacity constraint but instead have for each court a global constraint
on the total number of lawyers that can be accepted. In other words, we relax
the requirement that a mechanism produces a feasible allocation.
We continue to consider slot-specific choice functions and build on the time-
specific choice function Chtsc to develop the flexible choice function Ch
f lex
c . As
before there are qc,t copies of a slot of type t and the slots with a lower t have
higher precedence. Under the time-specific choice function Chtsc each slot’s pri-
ority ordering was such that only periods of the associated time period were
deemed acceptable and acceptable contracts were ranked according to ≻c. Un-
der Ch f lexc each slot’s priority ordering Πs ranks highest the contracts of the
associated time period. Next highest are ranked the contracts of period 1 (or pe-
riod 2 in case we are considering slots of the period 1 type), followed by those
contracts of the next highest period and so on.50 Contracts of the same period
are ranked according to ≻c. As a consequence each slot, irrespective of its types,
considers all contracts acceptable. Note that this allows for choices that violate
the time-specific capacity constraints of the courts.
50The ranking of contracts not involving period t by slots of type t does not matter for our
results, so long as all contracts involving period t are ranked highest.
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Since the flexible choice function is also a slot-specific choice function and
since contracts, given a fixed period, are ranked according to ≻c by slots, the cu-
mulative offer process using these choice functions is a strategy-proof, weakly
Pareto efficient mechanism that eliminates justified envy and respects improve-
ments. The proofs are similar to those for the TSLOSM and are omitted. We call
this new mechanism the flexible lawyer offering stable mechanism (FLOSM)
and denote it by ψ f lex.
FLOSM does not necessarily satisfy the time-specific capacity constraints
of the courts, while the TSLOSM satisfies these constraints. Hence there may
be allocations that can be reached by FLOSM that violate feasibility under
TSLOSM but are preferred over allocations feasible under TSLOSM.
Proposition 13. Fix a lawyer matching problem (T, I,C,q,P,≻). Then we have
for all i that ψ f lex(P)(i)Riψ
ts(P)(i).
Proposition 13 says that all lawyers weakly prefer the outcome of the flex-
ible lawyer offering stable mechanism over the outcome of the time-specific
lawyer offering stable mechanism. The intuition behind this result is that the
time-specific choice function can be obtained from the flexible choice function
via truncation strategies. Truncation strategies by one side of the market make
the other side of the market weakly worse off. Hence we conclude that relax-
ing time-specific capacity constraints and suitably adapting the choice functions
used by the courts has the potential of making lawyers better off.51
We interpret the flexible choice function as corresponding to cases in which
a court is given greater budgetary freedom with respect to when to open trainee-
ship positions. In practice there may be other reasons for having time-specific
constraints that make adjustments to capacities over time difficult. For example,
class room sizes could constraint how many lawyers may begin their trainee-
ship in any given period of time.
6 Conclusion
While the above description of the Time-Specific Lawyer Offering Mechanism
is rather theoretical, from a practical point of view it could be interpreted in two
51This could happen for example by allowing courts to transfer funding for trainee-ship posi-




First, as a mechanism of perfect foresight, the matching for all lawyers at all
courts in all time periods is finalized already in period 0. This requires grades,
preferences etc. of arriving lawyers to be known already at time 0. If courts
before time t are unacceptable to some lawyer i, then we can think of i arriving
at time t. This interpretation could be realistic for short time horizons, however
less so for longer horizons.
The second interpretation is that the mechanism is run every single period,
whereby lawyers are allocated to positions now and in the future, ignoring future
arrivals. Then, once a lawyer is allocated to a future position, this seat remains
"reserved" for the current lawyer. In that case one needs to additionally analyze
how many future positions one allows to be assigned today.
An interesting extension of our model would be to consider how our pro-
posed mechanism behaves when it needs to be applied for each period over a
number of periods. Dur and Kesten (2014) consider a problem in which a set
of students is to be matched to colleges, but in which the set of colleges is par-
titioned. They show that when the assignment happens sequentially, it is inher-
ently difficult to have a mechanism be non-wasteful, and strategy-proof while
eliminating justified envy and respecting improvements. Such results would
also apply in a dynamic version of our model in which the time-specific lawyer-
optimal mechanism were applied repeatedly. A related problem, that we have
ignored so far, is how to manage capacity. While we assumed that capacities
were given exogenously, in a dynamic procedure with excess demand one may
want to reserve some capacity at some courts to ensure that future agents are not
unduly disadvantaged by earlier agents taking these positions. Future research
should address this question.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs
Proof. [Lemma 4] Suppose to the contrary that for court c and a set of con-
tracts Y with elements y,x ∈ Y such that yC = xC = c, yI ≻c xI , yT = xT and
x ∈ Chtispc (Y ) but that there does not exist z ∈ Ch
tisp
c (Y ) with zI = yI . Note that
in particular this implies that y /∈ Chtispc (Y ). Then since such a z does not exist,
it must be that in step yT = t of the procedure to construct Ch
tisp
c , y has not yet
been rejected. So in step t both x and y are still available. Now x is accepted in
step t since x ∈ Chtispc (Y ) while y is rejected, since y /∈ Ch
tisp
c (Y ). This contra-
dicts yI ≻c xI , since the procedure to construct the time-specific choice function
would have selected the contract of the agent with the better ranking.
Proof. [Lemma 5] Towards a contradiction let k′ be the first step a court c holds
a contract z that was previously rejected at step k < k′. As z is rejected at step
k, it was on hold by court c at step (k− 1) or it was offered to court c at step
k. In either case no other contract of lawyer zI could be on hold by court c at
step (k − 1). But then, since z is the first contract to be held after an earlier
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. Since z is rejected at step k, this means that for all





denote the set of such contracts in time zT . Given the definition of Ch
tisp
c ,
z ∈ Chtispc (Ac(k




(zT ) can no
longer have been under consideration in step t of the procedure to find the
court’s choice. But for that to have happened, it must be that some contract
y with yI = xI and yT < xT has been accepted in step k′. But this cannot be since
by assumption z is the first contract that was rejected and subsequently accepted
and because xI cannot have offered a contract in step k′ since a contract of xI
was held by the court in period k′−1. Hence a contradiction.
Proof. [Lemma 6] To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that for any sta-
ble allocation X ′ ⊆ X̃ and any contract z ∈ X ′, contract z is not rejected by the
cumulative offer algorithm when the time-specific choice function is used. To
obtain a contradiction, suppose not. Let k be the first step where court c = zC
rejects contract z, and let Y = Chtispc (Ac(k)). Then by IRC, z /∈ Ch
tisp
c (Y ∪{z}).
Then by lemma 5, zI /∈YI . As k is the first step a contract in any stable allocation
is rejected, every lawyer in YI weakly prefers their contract in Y to their contract
in X ′ which is stable by assumption. We then consider two cases:
Case 1: z /∈ Chtispc (Y ∪X
′). In this case, court c blocks allocation X ′ together
with lawyers in YI , contradicting stability of X ′.
Case 2: z ∈ Chtispc (Y ∪X
′). But this cannot be, since for any x ∈ Chtispc (Y ) with
xT = zT , we have for all s < t, (xI,c,s) ∈ Y by weak impatience.
Therefore the addition of contracts cannot result in z being chosen when both
Y and X ′ are available due to the way the time-specific choice function is con-
structed. A contradiction.
For the proof of Proposition 13 we make use of an associated lawyer-slot
matching market as in Kominers and Sönmez (2016). A lawyer-slot match-
ing market is constructed from a lawyer-court allocation problem in which the
courts have slot-specific choice functions Chc(·;⊲c,Πc) as follows. The con-
tract set X is extended to the set Z defined by Z ≡ {(x,s) : x ∈ X and s ∈ SxC}.
Slot priorities Π̃sover contracts in Z are derived from priorities Πsc over contracts
in X . This means that (x,s)Π̃s(x′,s) if and only if xΠscx
′. A lawyer’s preferences
P̃i over contracts in Z remain the same as preferences Pi over contracts in X
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with ties between the same contract at different slots broken according to the
precedence order. This means that (x,s)P̃i(x′,s′) if and only if either xPix′ or
[x = x′ and s ⊲xC s
′].
Proof. [Proposition 13] For any instance of a lawyer-court allocation problem
we construct the lawyer-slot matching problem as follows. By Theorem A.1 of
Kominers and Sönmez (2016) the outcome of the lawyer offering stable mecha-
nism in a lawyer-court matching with waiting time problem in which courts use
slot-specific choice functions, corresponds to the outcome of the lawyer offering
stable mechanism in the associated lawyer-slot matching market.
Suppose now that one slot s ∈ Sc in the lawyer-slot market truncates from its
priority ordering its lowest ranked contract, say x. If that contract was not part
of the allocation under the lawyer offering stable mechanism without the trun-
cation, then this truncation has no effect on the final allocation. If that contract
was part of the allocation under the lawyer offering stable mechanism without
the truncation, then the lawyer xI applies to her next highest ranked slot, s′.
The slot s′ will either accept lawyer xI’s contract (in the process possibly re-
jecting another contract of another lawyer) or reject it. In either case there will
be a finite chain of rejections of contracts. All lawyers involved in this rejection
chain will receive a worse allocation than without the truncation of slot s accord-
ing to their preferences over slots. There are now two possibilities. Either all
lawyers find the new allocation worse only because of the tie-breaking induced
by the precedence order ⊲c. In that case the lawyers in the original lawyer-court
matching with waiting time problem are unaffected by the truncation. If the new
allocation is worse because of a change in the court and time period allocated to
a lawyer, then lawyers in the original lawyer-court matching will be worse off.
A similar logic applies to any further truncation by any slot. Each trunca-
tion makes the lawyers weakly worse off. Consider now the case in which each
slot’s priorities have been truncated to only find contracts involving a time pe-
riod corresponding to the slot’s type acceptable. In that case the outcome of
the lawyer-optimal stable mechanism in the lawyer-slot matching problem cor-
responds to the outcome of the lawyer-proposing stable mechanism under the
time-specific choice functions. By the previous arguments, all lawyers weakly
prefer the allocation without any truncations.
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